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RELIGIOUS LUCK 
Linda Zagzebski 
Recently the problem of moral luck identified by Joel Feinberg, Thomas 
Nagel, and Bernard Williams has captured a lot of attention in ethics. In this 
paper I argue that the problem exists for Christian moral theory and practice 
as well, and that the problem is magnified by certain aspects of Christian 
theology, including the doctrines of grace and of an eternal heaven and hell. 
I then consider five solutions to the problem, all of which involve modifying 
in one way or another either traditional Christian doctrines or common views 
on the grounds for moral evaluation. 
I. Introduction 
Moral luck occurs when a person's degree of moral responsibility for an act 
or a personal trait goes beyond the degree to which she controls it. If it exists, 
people are the proper objects of moral evaluation, including praise and blame, 
reward and punishment, because of something that is partly due to luck. 
Thomas Nagel has argued that this is not a mistake in our moral practices, 
but is a consequence of the right way of looking at morality. We cannot 
eliminate luck without destroying moral evaluation altogether. Nonetheless, 
most of us find moral luck repulsive- even, perhaps, incoherent. Surely it 
must be the case that each of us has an equal chance at the one thing that 
matters most: our moral worth. While we must put up with elements of chance 
and fortune in the other aspects of our lives, how could this happen in mo-
rality? In fact, we could make a strong case for the view that a primary 
distinguishing feature of moral evaluation as opposed to other sorts of evalu-
ation is that it is completely luck-free. And not only is it luck-free, it com-
pensates for the prevalence of luck in the other areas of our lives. There is, 
then, a kind of ultimate cosmic justice. Nevertheless, Thomas Nagel, Bernard 
Williams, Joel Feinberg, and others have persuasively argued that morality 
is permeated with luck. If they are right, morality is threatened with incon-
sistency. 
In this paper I will focus on the problems of moral luck identified by Nagel 
and Feinberg and will argue that they exist for Christian moral practice and 
Christian moral theories as well. In addition, the problem of luck for the 
Christian is worsened by several elements not found in secular morality, 
including the traditional doctrine of grace and the doctrine of an eternal 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 11 No.3 July 1994 
All rights reserved. 
397 
398 Faith and Philosophy 
heaven and hell. Historical disputes over these doctrines within Christianity 
do not go to the heart of the luck problem. At one time the dispute took the 
form of the controversy over predestination vs. free will. Nowadays it is more 
usual for the focus to be on the question of whether an eternal hell is consis-
tent with divine justice, mercy, goodness, or love. The problem I am raising, 
however, is not a problem about free will or the coherence of the divine 
attributes, but is a problem internal to the concepts of moral responsibility, 
reward, and punishment as understood by the Christian. I will argue that while 
secular morality has no resources to handle moral luck, Christianity can do 
so either by eliminating it or by renduring it innocuous. I will consider five 
ways this might be done, none of which are options outside of Christian 
theology, but each of which raises problems of its own. 
II. The Case for Moral Luck 
In well-known papers by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel the existence 
of moral luck has been identified and illustrated with numerous examples. l 
Nagel argues that there are three main sources of moral luck: luck in conse-
quences, luck in circumstances, and luck in constitution, the last of which 
might more properly be called luck in traits of character. Together they make 
luck so pervasive that it contaminates virtually every type of moral theory as 
well as common moral practice. 
Consider first luck in consequences. The idea here is that the outcome of 
a person's act affects his degree of fault even though the way things turn out 
is to some extent beyond his control. To take one of Nagel's examples: 
If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves on to the sidewalk, 
he can count himself morally luck if there are no pedestrians in his path. If 
there were, he would be to blame for their deaths, and would probably be 
prosecuted for manslaughter. But if he hurts no one, although his recklessness 
is exactly the same, he is guilty of a far less serious legal offense and will 
certainly reproach himself and be reproached by others much less severely.2 
Although the example is a legal one, it is clear in the subsequent discussion 
that Nagel thinks that the degree of moral responsibility differs in the two 
cases even though the degree of control by the agent is the same. 
Luck in consequences is the category given the most attention by both 
Williams and Nagel, but it is also the most vulnerable to objection.3 I will 
therefore not make any of my claims in this paper depend upon there being 
luck of this type. Let us then consider the Kantian move of focusing moral 
assessment exclusively on the internal sphere of intentions or acts of will. 
What accrues to our discredit is not literally what we do, on this approach, 
but only those mental acts by which we do it. 
Will this move eliminate the problem of moral luck? Unfortunately, it will 
not. For one thing, a person forms intentions only when the occasion arises, 
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but the arising of the occasion is the result of circumstances largely beyond 
the agent's control. Again, to take one of Nagel's examples: 
Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically 
by opposing the regime. They also had an opportunity to behave badly, and 
most of them are culpable for having failed the test. But it is a test to which 
the citizens of other countries were not subjected, with the result that even 
if they, or some of them, would have behaved as badly as the Germans in 
like circumstances, they simply did not and therefore are not similarly cul-
pable.4 
In an earlier paper, Joel Feinberg made the same point that responsibility 
for one's inner states can in some circumstances be wholly a matter of luck.5 
He considers the case of Hotspur, the unfortunate slapper of Hemo, an equally 
unfortunate hemophiliac, who dies as the result of Hotspur's slap. 
Imagine that we have photographed the whole episode and are now able to 
project the film in such very slow motion that we can observe every stage of 
Hotspur's action and (constructively) even the "inner" anticipatory stages .... 
At each of these cinematographic stages there is some state of affairs for 
which we might hold Hotspur responsible. We can also conceive of a third 
party, call him Witwood, who is in all relevant respects exactly like Hotspur 
but who, through luck, would have escaped responsibility at each stage, were 
he in Hotspur's shoes. We can imagine, for example, that had Witwood caused 
Hemo's mouth to hemorrhage, Hemo's life would have been saved by some 
new drug; or at an earlier stage, instead of becoming responsible for Hemo's 
cut mouth, Witwood lands only a glancing blow which does not cut; or again, 
instead of becoming responsible for the painful impact of hand on face, 
Witwwod swings at a ducking Hemo and misses altogether. Though similar 
in his intentions and deeds to Hotspur, Witwood escapes responsibility 
through luck. 
The same good fortune is possible at earlier "internal" stages. For example, 
at the stage when Hotspur would begin to burn with rage, a speck of dust 
throws Witwood into a sneezing fit, preventing any rage from arising. He can 
no more be responsible for a feeling he did not have than for a death that did 
not happen. Similarly, at the point when Hotspur would be right on the verge 
of forming his intention, Witwood is distracted at just that instant by a loud 
noise. By the time the noise subsides, Witwood's blood has cooled, and he 
forms no intention to slap Hemo. Hotspur, then, is responsible- I suppose 
some would say "morally" responsible- for his intention, whereas Witwood, 
who but for an accidental intrusion on his attention would have formed the 
same intention, luckily escapes responsibility.6 
Since the introduction of Witwood to the analysis of Hotspur is just a 
colorful way of talking about what Hotspur himself might have done if he 
had not been unlucky, the objection might be raised that the claim of moral 
luck in circumstances rests on the questionable view that there are true coun-
terfactuals of freedom of the form: In circumstances C Hotspur would have 
done X. But, in fact, the case rests on no such problematic counterfactuals. 
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It is not necessary that the circumstances in which Hotspur would not have 
struck Hemo are precisely specifiable, even in principle. All that is required 
is that there are some counterfactual circumstances (perhaps with the proviso 
that these circumstances not be too far removed from the actual ones) in 
which Hotspur does not strike Hemo, and that it is beyond Hotspur's control 
that these circumstances do not obtain; and surely that much is true. 
The natural response at this point of the story of Hotspur and Witwood is 
to go back even further, before the situation arose. As Feinberg describes the 
case, Hotspur and Witwood have the same character traits relevant to the type 
of situation described. They are equally irascible or sensitive about personal 
remarks, and so if we make the primary focus of moral judgment character 
traits themselves. Hotspur and Witwood are equally at fault and so Hotspur 
neither benefits nor suffers from moral luck arising from actual intentions or 
feelings. Feinberg does not pursue this line, but Nagel considers it briefly 
with examples of the traits of envy and conceit and claims that they also are 
not impervious to luck. As Nagel describes these cases, they are most natu-
rally understood as qualities of temperament rather than vices, but considera-
tions on the nature of virtues and vices show them to be heavily affected by 
luck as well, at least they are on a classical Aristotelian theory. To Aristotle 
traits of character are not inborn, but are habits acquired through imitation 
of others. The character of the persons to which one is exposed while young 
is clearly outside a person's control, yet it is the major factor in the acquisition 
of moral virtues and vices. So even if the primary moral responsibility of 
persons is for enduring traits of character rather than for intentions, acts, or 
their consequences, moral luck still exists. 
A thorough examination of the problem of moral luck would have to give 
careful attention to the development of our concepts of fault and responsibil-
ity and the purpose of rewards and punishments, but my conclusion at this 
stage is that moral luck does exist and is a flaw in the institution of morality 
as we know it. While I do not maintain that luck exists in all of Nagel's 
categories, there is surely luck in whatever it is people are morally evaluated 
for since every suggestion on what that is is covered by one of Nagel's or 
Feinberg's categories. The range of luck is wide enough to cover just about 
every object of moral evaluation in every known theory: consequences, acts, 
intentions, dispositions, character traits. Even worse, there is no reason to 
think that a new theory would help since the problem is pervasive in the 
practice of morality as we know it, not just in its theoretical formulations. 
I maintain, then, that moral luck exists, but I also maintain that the Kantian 
intuition that morality ought to be free of luck is justified. So while we cannot 
escape moral luck, we ought to devise moral practices and ways of theorizing 
that minimize it. What Nagel and Feinberg do not say is that the degree of 
moral luck is less for some forms of moral evaluation than for others. If we 
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extend Feinberg's imaginary exercise and trace a line backwards from the 
consequences of an act, to the physical act itself, to the intention to perform 
the act, to the psychic states out of which the intention is formed, to the 
enduring character traits from which the act arises, we find that the farther 
back we go, the less luck there is. This is because each later point of assess-
ment includes all the luck of the previous points as well as some others. There 
is a cumulative effect in moral luck. So in Feinberg's example of Hotspur, 
his degree of luck in killing Hemo includes the luck involved in the personal 
qualities that led him to become violent, aggravated by the degree of luck in 
the circumstances in which the intention to commit the act was formed, 
aggravated by the degree of luck in the circumstances in which death follows 
the act. The class of theories which focus moral evaluation on intentions are 
therefore preferable to those which focus on consequences in that they allow 
less room for luck. Even better than intention-based theories are virtue-based 
theories. At least with respect to the problem of luck, virtue theories have the 
advantage. 
Nagel is rather sanguine about the existence of moral luck. It is something 
we will have to live with it, he says; we really do not have any choice. 
Morality may be defective, but we're stuck with it. Notice that this is a 
reasonable response only if we think of morality as having finite significance. 
While Nagel does not explicitly make such an assumption, it is clear that a 
major part of the reason he is willing to accept moral luck is that he assumes 
it is closely tied to human intuitions, purposes, and practices, the defects of 
which are so obvious that it really should not be any surprise that the defects 
extend to the ground of moral evaluation itself. 
Feinberg's conclusion following his discussion of the case of Hotspur and 
Witwood is somewhat different from Nagel's, but equally interesting. Moral 
responsibility is a matter about which we are all confused, Feinberg con-
cludes, and no particular philosopher or school is especially gUilty of this 
confusion. The problem is not only that our degree of responsibility exceeds 
our degree of control, as Nagel maintains, but that our moral responsibility 
is indeterminate. even in principle. 
III. The Luck of the Christian 
Christian ethics has some of the same problems of luck that face secular 
ethics. Perhaps Christian moral theorists are less inclined to hold a person 
responsible for consequences beyond those she can control, and to that extent 
Christian ethics does not face the most severe of the three types of moral luck 
identified by Nagel. Still, the range of objects of moral evaluation within 
Christian moral theories are all things that Nagel and Feinberg have demon-
strated to my satisfaction to possess a degree of luck. To the extent that there 
is luck in one's moral responsibility for one's virtues and vices, the circum-
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stances in which one forms one's intentions, and the resulting acts them-
selves, to that extent the Christian faces moralluck.7 As the Christian under-
stands morality, then, we are faced at least with luck in circumstances and in 
traits of character. 
But Christian ethics differs from secular ethics in ways that make the matter 
of luck especially problematic. In the first place, Christian moral theory 
replaces the concept of moral wrongdoing by the concept of sin, an offense 
against God, and the concept of an abstract state of moral worth which may 
or may not be determinable is replaced by the concept of one's moral state 
as judged by God. And presumably that should be determinable. Furthermore, 
there is less room for the acceptance of luck in Christian ethics than in ethics 
as conceived by Nagel since to the Christian morality is not simply an insti-
tution dependent upon the finite concerns of limited and defective humans. 
What's more, Kantian intuitions are strong in the Christian tradition and it 
can be plausibly argued that Kant was heavily influenced by Christian sen-
sibilities in devising his idea that moral worth is strictly under our control. 
In fact, the precursor to Kant's idea exists in St. Augustine's De Libero 
Arbitrio. There Augustine says that we are contented only if we possess the 
"good will" (bona voluntas), which is the only good fully within our power. 
and of which we cannot be deprived by worldy circumstances. R 
To make matters worse, traditional Christianity includes two doctrines 
which, on the face of it. magnify the problem of luck to infinity. These are 
the doctrines of grace and of an eternal heaven and hell. 
Consider first the doctrine of grace. On all accounts grace is necessary for 
salvation and is an unearned gift of God. While accounts of grace within 
Christianity differ with respect to the question of how much our efforts can 
affect the reception of grace, no one suggests that it is wholly under our 
control. There is, then, religious luck. What's more, religious luck magnifies 
moral luck, at least in the theology of Aquinas, since he says that not only 
are the greatest of the virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, infused by grace, but 
no merit accrues to our possession of the ordinary "natural" virtues such as 
kindness, justice, and courage without the action of grace. And Christian 
Charity is the supreme virtue without which no other trait we possess nor act 
we perform gives us any merit. 
Most serious of all, the reward or punishment to which a life of grace or 
the lack of it leads is an eternal heaven or hell. This element of Christian 
teaching multiplies the effects of moral luck and the luck of grace to infinity. 
I will not speculate here on the nature of eternity; eternal reward or punish-
ment may not be infinite in duration. Nonetheless, it must be the case that an 
eternal reward is infinitely greater than an earthly reward and an eternal 
punishment is infinitely greater than an earthly punishment. A person controls 
her individual choices and acts and the series of choices and acts which make 
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up her life only up to a point, yet her reward or punishment is infinite. This 
means that even in the best case, one in which we can assume that the 
cumulative luck in a person's life from natural qualities, circumstances, and 
consequences is fairly small, since an infinite reward or punishment is at 
stake, the effects of even a small degree of luck become infinite. 
Religious luck is not strictly parallel to moral luck, however. Moral luck 
occurs when the rewards or punishments a person deserves are partially a 
function of matters beyond the person's control. In the case of religious luck, 
however, Christian doctrine maintains that everyone deserves the worst pun-
ishment, namely, eternal damnation. So religious luck is not luck in what one 
deserves, although it is luck in what one gets after the final judgment, and 
that at least appears to be reward and punishment. Two people may be in 
exactly the same position as far as their control is concerned, yet one is saved 
and the other is damned.9 So the fact that moral luck is a matter of desert and 
religious luck is not hides a more fundamental similarity. Both moral and 
religious luck involve an inequality in the way persons are treated by the 
institution of morality itself. 
A more important way that religious luck is disanalogous with moral luck 
is that most Christian theologians maintain that grace is offered in such 
abundance that everyone receives more than is sufficient for salvation. In 
fact, on some accounts everyone receives many times a sufficiency. This 
changes the analogy with the cases of moral luck in circumstances. A typical 
example of the latter is a situation in which two persons, David and Mark, 
appear at the scene of a burning house. David gets there first and saves a 
child from the fire. Mark would have done the same thing had he arrived on 
time, but as it is, David is the moral hero instead. Although Mark did not 
even have the opportunity to save the child, David both gets and deserves 
more praise than Mark. 
To make this case analogous to the case of religious luck due to the cir-
cumstances of grace, its description must be amended. We would have to say 
that both David and Mark have numerous chances to save a child from a 
burning house or acts of a similar nature, and all either one of them has to 
do to receive the big reward is to perform one such act of heroism. David 
does have more chances than Mark, but as long as Mark has opportunities in 
abundance, the inequality between him and David loses some of its sting. 
This suggests that the greater the opportunities for even the least religiously 
lucky person, the less problematic the inequality between his luck and some-
one else's appears to US.lO Nonetheless, the issue of the inequality remains, 
and that is the heart of the problem of luck as proposed by Nagel. 
Historical disputes within Christian theology over predestination vs. free 
will and over the precise nature of Faith and the way grace works were partly 
disputes about luck, but not in the sense we are considering. All sides agreed 
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that no one earns or deserves grace, and so grace is obviously a matter of 
luck in the sense that it is gratuitous. Still, there were disputes over the 
relationship between human effort, will, or action and the reception of grace. 
There may have been less room for luck in the Catholic position than in the 
Calvinist position, but all the traditional positions included a substantial 
degree of luck in the sense we are addressing here, even the Pelagian heresy. 
It should be clear from Nagel's discussion that the issue is not one about 
incompatibilist free will. If there is no incompatibiIist free will, then our 
moral acts, choices, and traits of character are wholly a matter of luck. If 
there is incompatibilist free will, then they are only partly a matter of luck. 
This is because the claim that there is incompatibilist free will is merely the 
claim that past circumstances do not completely determine the choice that a 
person makes; no one disputes that past circumstances, including many be-
yond a person's control, strongly influence a person's choice. So no matter 
which way we go on free will, there is luck. This luck contaminates any 
account of moral worth, including accounts of grace. If grace is both offered 
and received without any control by the recipient, then the luck of it is 
overwhelming and obvious. If the recipient controls either its offer or its 
acceptance to any extent through a free choice, the luck is still present in 
abundance, only less obviously so. 
As with the doctrine of grace, traditional discussions of heaven and hell 
have tended to be about different problems from the one I am addressing. 
Even in contemporary philosophical theology discussions on the existence of 
hell usually approach it from the point of view of its consistency with other 
divine attributes: divine justice (Peter Geach, George Schlesinger), divine 
goodness (John Hick, Eleonore Stump, Richard Swinburne), and divine love 
(Thomas Talbott).11 The question that concerns me here is not a problem for 
the divine attributes, but a problem for the Christian conception of morality 
itself. If there is moral luck and that is a flaw in morality, we cannot so 
blithely say as Nagel does that that is just something we will have to live 
with. The stakes are infinitely greater than those assumed by Nagel. 
IV. What Makes Luck a Problem? 
On the face of it the problem of luck in Christian moral theology is far greater, 
even infinitely greater than it is for secular moral practice and theory. But on 
the face of it Christian theology with its doctrines of an omniscient and 
provident God also has the resources to handle conceptual difficulties which 
would be impossible for a theory without such a deity. God can mend prob-
lems in moral evaluation that nothing can mend in ordinary moral practice. 
But before turning to the ways God can alleviate the problem of luck, let us 
look more closely at exactly what makes luck a problem for moral evaluation 
for ironically, the existence of an omniscient God worsens the problem of 
moral luck in one respect. 
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There are many kinds of luck. No one denies that we do not all begin life 
with the same advantages- in natural endowment, in material well-being, in 
the emotional support of the family, etc .. and as life goes on those advantages 
and disadvantages can change- some due to human choices, some not. It is 
sometimes argued that a just society should attempt to minimize the effects 
of luck by such things as aid to persons with physical or mental handicaps 
or special academic programs for the disadvantaged, or programs aiming at 
redistributing income. One thing is certain, however; pure luck is much easier 
to accept morally than inequality that is the result of human choice or social 
or economic structures over which we have some control. Helmut Schoeck 
argues in his classic study on envy that the concept of luck is a socially 
positive concept which mitigates the envy resulting from material or social 
differences: 
It is significant that concepts such as luck, chance, opportunity, 'hitting the 
jackpot' - what we generally regard as someone's being undeservingly fa-
voured by circumstances beyond his or our control- are not found in all 
cultures. Indeed, in many languages there is no way of expressing such ideas. 
Yet where one of these concepts exists in a society, it plays a crucial part in 
controlling the problem of envy. Man can come to terms with the evident 
inequality of the individual human lot, without succumbing to envy that is 
destructive of both himself and others, only if he can put the responsibility 
on some impersonal power-blind chance or fortune, which neither he him-
self nor the man favoured is able to monopolize. "Today it's the other man 
who is lucky-tomorrow it may be I." We derive the same consolation from 
the expression "to have bad luck." Thus what is involved is no providential 
God, whose favours can be won by special zeal in worship or a pure way of 
life, for this would most surely induce that bitter, consuming envy of the 
"holier-than-thou" fanatic, so amply corroborated by history- as in the witch 
trials, for instance. 12 
Once we get past Schoeck's concluding hyperbole, we see that he has sug-
gested an additional problem of luck for the Christian. We have already seen 
that it is difficult to accept that even a portion of the grounds upon which we 
are morally evaluated are beyond our control, but what is worse, we are not 
even able to fall back on the idea of our moral luck as blind chance or the 
luck of the draw. If there is an omniscient God it is not accurate to describe 
that which we do not control as pure luck- something that is nobody's fault. 
The luck described by Nagel and Feinberg occurs due to impersonal forces 
that have nothing against you (or for you) personally. So if Sarah had been 
born with a more naturally cheerful disposition, she would have found it much 
easier to acquire the virtues of benevolence. If Mark had arrived at the 
burning building a few moments earlier, he would have been the one to save 
the child instead of David. If the young gang member had not been born in 
poverty to a drug-addicted mother and an absent father, he would not now be 
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in court faced with a string of charges from car theft to murder. In each case 
there is nobody to blame for the bad luck. It just happened that way. But if 
there is an omniscient God, and especially if omniscience includes a degree 
of knowledge of what a person would do or would be likely to do in coun-
terfactual circumstances, it does look as if God is picking on some people. 
So moral luck for the Christian is faced with a dual problem. Not only is 
there the problem identified by Nagel and magnified by the doctrines of grace 
and eternal reward and punishment, but the element of luck for the Christian 
is not independent of the knowledge and will of God. God permits it to go 
on in full awareness of who will be morally lucky and who will be unlucky. 
There is not even the consolation of luck as impersonal chance. 
There is another way to look at luck, however, in which even conscious 
and calculated luck in some circumstances may seem benign. Brynmor 
Browne argues that luck in rewards is not nearly so bad as luck in punish-
ments.]3 It is not as bad if some people are rewarded beyond what they control 
than for some people to be punished beyond what they control, and this is at 
least part of the reason that nobody complains about the existence of an 
eternal heaven, while many people argue that there is something wrong with 
an eternal hell. It is reasonable to say that no one has been treated unfairly 
in rewards as long as each person is rewarded at least as much as she deserves. 
So even if some people are rewarded more than they deserve and the reward 
is not based on the luck of the draw but is consciously calculated by the 
reward-giver, then there are no grounds for complaint on the part of those 
who receive less. Presumably this is the moral of the Parable of the Workers 
in the Vineyard. 
But parallel considerations can be given for the fairness of luck in punish-
ments. Just as there is no unfairness as long as each person is rewarded at 
least as much as she deserves, we might say that there is no unfairness as 
long as each person is punished no more than she deserves. In each case it 
is gratuitous generosity that motivates the giver of rewards and punishments 
to increase the reward or to decrease the punishment for some. Just as only 
envy or spite could lead me to complain that others are the recipients of 
special generosity in receiving rewards, similarly, only envy or spite could 
lead me to complain that others are the recipients of special generosity in 
receiving punishments. In both cases, fairness for me is determined by my 
direct dealings with the laws of morality and their divine sanctions. The fact 
that someone else gets special consideration should be no concern of mine. 
On the model of the workers in the vineyard, we can think of my relationship 
with morality as being like a contract between me, God, and the laws of 
morality. What happens to other people is irrelevant to me. 
This defense of the element of luck even in the case in which luck is not 
blind forces us to come to terms with the issue of inequality which we have 
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identified as the heart of the examples of moral and religious luck. There is 
little doubt that there is something repellent about inequality to the contem-
porary mind, although it might be argued that this is an obsession arising 
from modern political theory. But even if contemporary worries about in-
equality in wealth or opportunity are excessive, it hardly seems excessive to 
worry about inequality in moral assessment itself, especially when the con-
sequences are as drastic as infinite reward or punishment. Inequality of treat-
ment by morality and by God are not easily dismissed. 
But there is an even more fundamental worry that the defense of religious 
luck just given overlooks. The problem of moral luck is not fundamentally a 
problem about the comparison of the moral worth of one person and another, 
but a comparison of the moral worth of a particular person and that same 
person under different counterfactual circumstances. The bothersome in-
equality, then, is between one person and himself in other possible circum-
stances. To return to Feinberg's example, the problem is not that Hotspur is 
the unlucky bearer of bad moral luck while Witwood has good moral luck, 
but that Hotspur might have been Witwood. As Witwood is described by 
Feinberg, he is just Hotspur's alternative self. The problem of envy which 
we find in the parable of the Workers in the Vineyard does not arise on this 
reading of the problem. Hotspur cannot be envious of his alternative self. He 
is simply distressed that he is not that self and that the fact that he is not is 
wholly beyond his control. The solution to the Christian problem of moral 
luck must address the problem that Hotspur and Witwood are the same person 
and it is only luck that determines that it is Hotspur that is actualized, not 
Witwood. 
V. Five Ways to Deal with Religious Luck 
Suppose that there are true counterfactuals of freedom and that God has 
Middle Knowledge. That is to say, for each person God knows what that 
person would freely choose to do in every possible situation. God would then 
be in a position to judge her, not just for her actual virtues and vices, the acts 
she in fact performs, and their actual consequences, but for the sum total of 
everything she would choose to do in every possible circumstance. Of course, 
some of those circumstances exhibit bad luck, but others exhibit good luck. 
It is reasonable to think, then, that luck is eliminated if her choices in the 
totality of possible circumstances are the basis for her moral assessment. 
Lovers of Middle Knowledge who are haters of moral luck may find this 
solution attractive. Such a procedure for moral assessment would no doubt 
have a levelling effect on the moral worth of human beings. After all, there 
is probably some possible circumstance in which almost anybody would do 
almost anything, whether it be good or bad. Whether this consequence is a 
good or a bad feature of this solution, I cannot say. A feature of it that many 
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would find seriously defective, though, is that it makes the actual world 
meaningless as far as moral evaluation is concerned. In fact, there is really 
no reason to have an actual world at all for such purposes; God might just as 
well have created the beings he wanted and have gone straight on to their 
final judgment, skipping the in-between step of letting a particular world 
unfold. It must be admitted, then, that this approach is very far removed from 
our ordinary notions of moral evaluation. But, of course, the defender of this 
approach can always say that that is because our ordinary notions of moral 
evaluation are permeated with elements of luck, as Williams and Nagel have 
shown, and the proper response to this is to say so much the worse for our 
ordinary notions of moral evaluation. So while I do not think this approach 
is absurd, it should be admitted that it is radical. 
A second solution is to say that a person is morally evaluated for just that 
element of her character and her acts which she controls. Although Nagel 
does say that when we view ourselves from the outside that portion of the 
moral self that we control threatens to shrink into nothing, still, the argument 
that there is moral luck does not rest on such a position, and in this paper I 
have been leaving open the possibility that there is incompatibilist free will. 
If so, why couldn't our moral evaluation be determined by an omniscient God 
in proportion to our control? 
The problem here is that it is not at all clear that there is any such thing as 
the proportion of our control. Recall Joel Feinberg's conclusion to the dis-
cussion of Hotspur and Witwood. There he claims that moral responsibility 
is indeterminate, not just relative to our epistemic situation, but in itself. The 
precise determinability of moral responsibility is an illusion, he says; moral 
responsibility is undecidable in principle. While Feinberg's argument may 
not be given with the care necessary to demonstrate such a dramatic conclu-
sion, it does at least draw our attention to the range of questions that would 
have to have determinate answers if luck were to be eliminated by this move. 
Not only would there need to be a determinate degree of causal control a 
person has over a choice, but there would have to be a determinate degree of 
control that a person has over the fact that she is in certain actual circum-
stances rather than in anyone of the infinite number of counterfactual cir-
cumstances. Further, there would have to be a determinate degree of her 
control over the fact that she has the virtues and vices that she has. It is highly 
doubtful that there is any such degree at all. And if not, even an omniscient 
judge could not base his evaluation on it. 
A third solution is suggested by George Schlesinger in a discussion of 
divine justice.14 The problem he addresses there is much more narrowly 
focused than the one I am raising here, but the solution might be applicable. 
Schlesinger is concerned about the fact that the religious beliefs requisite for 
salvation are much easier for some to acquire than others. As he puts it, 
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different individuals have different opportunities to avail themselves of ar-
guments and evidence for the existence of God: 
Suppose I am a non-believer who has remained unconvinced by the various 
proofs for God's existence I have read or hard. There is, however, a new 
argument which would appeal to me so much that it would most likely convert 
me to theism. It so happens that I never get the chance to gain knowledge of 
the argument and thus persist in my ungodly ways. Is it not grossly unfair 
that, owing to circumstances beyond my control, I should be deprived of the 
ultimate felicity I could have shared with the righteous?15 
While Schlesinger puts the emphasis on the acceptance of theism based on 
argument, one need not be an evidentialist to agree that whatever it takes to 
believe in God is not something which everyone has an equal opportunity to 
obtain. Those who grow up in a happy religious home obviously have far 
greater opportunities for salvific Faith than those who grow up in deprived 
circumstances in which religion is either non-existent or, perhaps even worse, 
is associated in their experience with bigotry or hypocrisy. Schlesinger's 
answer is that "in accordance with the pain is the reward."16 "The true amount 
of virtue embodied in a given individual is not determined by the absolute 
level of piety he has reached, but by the nature of the hostile circumstances 
he has had to contend with in order to raise himself to the level he has 
succeeded in attaining."17 So the harder it is for a person to be saved, the 
greater his reward if he does his part in exhibiting a sincere good will; the 
easier it is for a person to be saved, the less the reward for making a lesser 
effort. So some people gamble for higher stakes with a lower chance of 
success, while others gamble for lower stakes with a higher chance of success. 
I have two worries about this solution. In the first place it is not at all clear 
that the initial positions of the sincere person in a pagan society and the 
ordinary person in religiously ideal circumstances are really equal. After all, 
a real gambler has a choice between going for higher stakes with a lower 
chance of winning or going for lower stakes with a higher chance of winning. 
Much of what makes the game fair is that the choice is his. But in the religious 
case as Schlesinger sees it, it is not up to us to choose the game we play. We 
do not get to decide initially how much of a risk we want to take. Secondly, 
this solution faces the same problem that infects the previous solution. Is it 
even possible in principle to determine a person's chance for salvation? Is 
there any such thing as the proportion of his success or failure that is due to 
efforts completely under his control? What Schlesinger does not mention is 
that luck in circumstances is only part of the problem. There is also luck in 
those traits of character which lead some people to make the greater efforts 
some need for salvation. What Schlesinger calls "a sincere good will" is itself 
partly a matter of luck. 
The fourth solution is to embrace a doctrine of grace according to which 
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grace not only does not aggravate luck, it eliminates it. ls The idea here is that 
since God desires everyone to be saved, more grace is given to the morally 
unlucky. Everyone gets grace, but some get more of it to compensate for their 
bad moral luck. This does seem to be what a loving parent would do. A mother 
who loves all her children equally will not necessarily give each child equal 
attention and help. Those who need it more, get more. On this approach it 
would not be necessary for God to determine in advance a precise level of 
grace needed to neutralize the effects of moral luck since God can intervene 
at any time to provide more than enough grace when needed. The problem 
of the indeterminacy in moral responsibility or degree of control could there-
fore be circumvented on this approach. 
This solution seems to me to be the best so far, but the problem is that it 
does not accord well with our experience. Of course it might be the case that 
truly corrupted criminals such as the principal character in the recent French 
film L'Elegant Criminel really did have more than enough chances to stay 
on the moral path and again later to reform themselves, but it certainly does 
not seem that way. What's more, an acceptance of this approach might lead 
to severe harshness in our moral assessment of others. That is, it suggests 
that the excuses people seem to have for their behavior are not really excuses 
after all since, unseen by us (and even themselves), they had even more 
opportunities for grace than most of us, but simply rejected it. 
The fifth solution is that while God does not eliminate moral luck, he makes 
it innocuous through universal salvation. This solution involves severing the 
moral order from the order of salvation. 
We have seen that Christian luck includes at least some of the kinds of luck 
discussed by Nagel and Feinberg, and that it is aggravated by several aspects 
of Christian doctrine. First, Christian luck is not blind, but is known in 
advance to an omniscient God. Second, there is some degree of inequality in 
the operation of grace. Third, and most serious of all, the doctrine of an 
eternal heaven and hell magnifies the extent of moral luck to infinity. What 
is most problematic in these doctrines is the way the concepts of grace, 
heaven, and hell are connected with the moral institution of rewards and 
punishments. Suppose, however, that there is no eternal hell. If so, we avoid 
the worst problem of an infinite degree of luck in punishment, and at the 
same time, an eternal heaven makes innocuous the effects of all the other 
sorts of moral and religious luck we have accumulated during our earthly 
existence, including inequality in the operation of grace. The fact that there 
is no blind luck and all of this is known to an omniscient God is an advantage 
rather than a disadvantage of this solution. 
It might appear radical to sever the moral order from the order of salvation, 
but notice that the Christian is already committed to this in part since Chris-
tian theology dissociates what we get from what we deserve in the case of 
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heaven. When the generosity of a reward-giver is extreme enough, it is inap-
propriate to call his gift a reward. Heaven is not a reward, and so it is not 
part of the moral order. Hell, however, is a punishment since all who go there 
deserve it. Such a view requires an awkward partial break between morality 
and ultimate destiny. The fifth solution to the problem of moral luck would 
make a clean break between the two. 
In distinguishing the moral order from the order of salvation, it is not 
necessary to radically alter our moral intuitions and practices in order to deal 
with moral luck, the major defect of the first solution. The solution of uni-
versal salvation does not take away luck in the moral order; moral luck simply 
has no bearing on one's ultimate destiny. This means that we can accept 
morality as a finite institution with finite significance, as Nagel does. If 
morality requires finite punishments after death, there is nothing in this so-
lution to prevent them from occurring. The point is that whatever the defects 
of the institution of morality as we know it, that is something we can live 
with as long as all is made well in eternity. A consequence of this solution is 
that morality is ultimately not as important as many of us think. In any case, 
it ought to be cut down to size, the only size it can realistically manage. 
This solution will be attractive to those who already maintain for inde-
pendent reasons that there is no eternal hell. The arguments I know of for 
this conclusion almost always rest on a consideration of the divine attributes, 
and the argument is that an eternal hell is inconsistent with either divine 
justice, mercy, goodness, or love. My argument here is concerned only with 
the problem of moral luck and the fact that the problem can be handled rather 
well if there is no eternal hell. Independent arguments for the non-existence 
of hell might give this solution additional support. It should be admitted, 
though, that this approach does go against the dominant view in the Christian 
tradition. It is mostly dependent upon a priori philosophical reasoning, but, 
then, most of the other solutions are a priori as well. It is doubtful that the 
problem of moral luck as I have formulated it in this paper was even consid-
ered in the tradition, so it is no surprise that there is little in the tradition of 
direct relevance to the problem.19 
VI. Conclusion 
I have argued in this paper that moral luck really is a problem and its existence 
shows that common views on morality flirt with inconsistency. Some of the 
sources of moral luck identified by Thomas Nagel and Joel Feinberg are 
problems for Christian morality as well. Moreover, I have argued that there 
are several features of Christian doctrine that magnify the problem enor-
mously. I have gone through five solutions to the problem. All of them in one 
degree or another modify traditional views about grace, heaven and hell, or 
the grounds for moral evaluation. The only way I know to maintain untouched 
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the traditional doctrines I have referred to in this paper requires the denial 
that moral luck is a problem even when infinite rewards and punishments are 
at stake. I believe this view to be deeply counter to modern moral sensibilities, 
although I have not attempted to defend those sensibilities in this paper, only 
to call attention to them. Furthermore, all of the solutions have problems of 
their own. But in spite of this, it seems to me that if the problem of moral 
luck has a solution at all, it will have to be within a theological structure 
which goes beyond morality as normally discussed in the secular philosophi-
cal literature. Non-religious ethics simply does not have the resources to 
handle the problem. For the purposes of this paper, I have considered only 
those approaches which arise within the Christian tradition. Non-Christian 
religious solutions, such as reincarnation, would also be worth considering. 20 
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